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7283

In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

GEORGE A. LOWE COMPANY a
corporation, THE SALT LAKE
HARDWARE C0~1P ANY, a corpora, tion and STREVELL PATERSON
HAR WARE COMPANY, a corporation,
Petitioners,
vs.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION
OF UTAH, DONALD HACKIN'-'""'~.Chairman, W. R. MciNTYRE an
OSCAR W. CARLESON, Commi s1oners,
Resp-ondents.
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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

GEORGE A. LOWE COMPANY a
corporation, THE SALT LAKE
HARDWARE COMPANY, a corporation, and STREVELL PATERSON
HARDWARE COMPANY, a corporation,
Petitioners,
vs.

Case No. 7283

PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

OF UTAH, DONALD HACKING,
Chairman, W. R. MciNTYRE and
OSCAR W. CARLESON, Commiss1oners,
Respondents.

BRIEF OF PETITIONERS
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This case results from an application by the petitioners for a writ of prohibition against the Public
Service Commission of Utah prohibiting it from attempting to assume jurisdiction over the petitioners and forbidding them the use of the public highways of the State
of Utah in the transportation by the petitioners of the
goods, wares and merchandise of the :petitioners by motor
•
vehicle upon the public highways of the state. Respondents replied asserting that petitioners were contract
carriers by motor vehicle and, as such, subject to the
jurisdiction of the commission. All facts in the case
have been stipulated and, in the broad sense, the only
question in the case is whether or not the Public Service
Commission may legally and constitutionally exercise
jurisdiction over the petitioners in their operations of
trans1porting their merchandise by motor vehicle.

FACTS

I.
During the month of October, 1948, the petitioners
herein entered into the following agreement:
AGREEMENT
This Agreement entered into this ____________ day
of October, 1948, by and between the GEORGE
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.A.. LO''TE CO~IP ANY of Ogden, Utah; THE
S.A.LT L~:\I~E HARD\V-ARE COMPANY of Salt
Lake City~ Utah: and STREVELL-P ATERSOX HARD,~V ...\RE COMP AN1... of Salt Lake
City, Utah.
,,~HERE ...t\.S,

the parties hereto and each of
then1 have goods of their own which from time to
time they desire to transport between Salt Lake
City and Ogden, lTtah, and
'';HEREAS, the parties hereto have agreed
to rent automotive equipment, to-=wit, a truck or
trucks, to transport the said goods.
IT IS HEREBY MUTUALLY A·GREED as
follows:
1. That the parties hereto each agree to employ a supervisor and a person or persons to drive
said truck, and
2. That each of the parties hereto hereby
agrees to pay the sup·ervisor his salary for the
separate time he is employed by it and to pay the
truck driver the salary for the pro rata time he
operates for it, and
3. Each of the parties hereto hereby agrees
to pay his separate pro rata share of any rentals
and expenses of said automotive equipment, and
4. That each of the parties hereto is to direct
the operation of the said employees as to its separate use of said equipment and said employees.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Signed THE SALT LAKE HARDWARE
CoMPANY
GEORGE A. LowE-COMPANY
STREVELL - pATERSON HARDWARE CoMPANY

II.
Pursuant to said agreement the petiti~oners rented
a truck and employed a driver therefor, and have
hauled and will continue to haul over the highways of
the state products belonging to the petitioners and the
products of no one else.

III.
Each of the petitioners pay the ~expenses of such
operation according to the pro rata share of use of each
petitioner of the truck facilities so employed and in
accordance with the terms of the agreement hereinbefore set forth.

IV.
I

The 'Petitioners have never applied for and have
never been granted a permit to operate as a contract
carrier in intra-state commerce.

v.
The Public Service Commission of Utah has informed the p~etitioners it will take necessary legal
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steps to prevent the continued operation in accordance
with the plan being carried on by the petitioners.
··vi.

Pursuant to said agreement hereinbefore set forth,
each of your petitioners herein pays the owner ·Of the
truck for each petitioner's share of the rental thereof.
Each petitioner herein pays the truck driver for each
petitioner's share ·of the salary of the truck driver.
Each of your petitioners severally pays his pro rata
share of the gasoline, oil and other incidental e~penses
of the said truck.

QUESTIONS
In the opinion of your petitioners there are three

questions involved.

I.
DO THE OPERATIONS OF THE PETITIONERS
HE'REIN CONSTITUTE A PARTNERSHIP?

II.
DO THE TRANSACTIONS CONDUCTED BY
THE PETITIO·NERS COME WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE STATUTES OF . UTAH, TO-WIT:
SECTION 76-5-13, U.C.A., 1943, AS AMENDED.''*:**
C'C>NTRACT MOTOR CARRIER O·F PROPERTY
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MEANS ANY PERSON ENGAGED IN THE TRANSPORTATION BY MOTOR VEHICLE OF PROPERTY FOR HIRE AND NOT INCLUDED IN THE
TERM, COMMON MOTOR CARRIER AS HEREINBEFORE DEFINED. * * *" )?
III.
DOES THE INTERPRETATION OF THE COMMISSION CONTRAVENE THE CONSTITUTIONS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH AND THE UNITED
STATES~

ARGUMENT

I.
DO THE OPERATIONS. OF THE PETITIONERS
HEREIN CONSTITUTE A PARTNERSHIP~
Petitioners herein claim that this question is immaterial, but since the commission is insistent that it has
a bearing on the case the petitioners herewith answer it.
Section 69-1-3, U.·C.A., 1943, reads as follows:
''A partnership is an association of two or more
persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit.
·* * * ''
The uniform partnership act, Section 6, is identical.
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It is obYious that this is not an association ''to carry on
as co-o,,~ners a business for profit'' .or at all. First, this
is not a business. Second, the petitioners herein are
not co-o,vners of anything. Third, there is no 1profit,
but all out-go fron1 the petitioners herein; the transactions engaged herein by the petitioners cannot eonceiv..
ably result in a profit.
Bentley

Y.

Brossard, 33 U 396; 94 P 736, 741, states:

''As to the general principles involved, and
particularly applicable to the case, we find no
better statement of the rule than that of Mr.
Justice Gray in the case of Meehan v. Valentine,
145 U. S. 611, 12 Supreme Court 972, 36 L. Ed.
835, as follows : 'The requisites of a partnership
are that the parties must have joined together
to carry on a trade or adventure for their common
benefit, each contributing property or services,
and having a community of interest in the profits.'
After reviewing the authorities it was further
observed by him: 'In the present state of the law
upon this subject it may perhaps be doubted whether any more precise general rule can be laid
down than as indicated at the beginning of this
opinion, that those partners are persons who contribute either property or money to carry on a
joint business for their common benefit, and who
own and share the profits thereof in certain ~~ro
portions. If they do this, the incidents or consequences follow that the acts of one in conducting
the partnership business are the acts of all; that
each is agent f~r the firm and for the other partners; that each receives part of the profits as proSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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fits, and takes p~rt of the fund ·to which the creditors of ~ partnership have a right to look for
the payment ·of their debts; that all are liable as
partners u1pon contracts made by any of them
with third persons within the scope of the partnership business; and that even an ·express stipulation between the~ that one shall not be so liable,
though good between themselves, is ineffectual
as against third persons. And participating in
profits is presumptive, but not conclusive, evidence of •partnership.' ''
T~e ~g~~eme~t ente~ed

into by a:p.d b~tween your
petitioners does not l>roviq~ for the essential requisites
of partnership. There is no joint own.ership of property, no profits in which your pe~itioners can participate,
no sharing of ex•penses on the same basis as in a partnership. There is n9. agency of one petitio:J;ler for another
£or any purpose whatsoever. There is no. carrying on
of a trad~, adventure or business for the petitioners
~ommon benefit. The ~~ve~ture herein_, if any such
there he, is for their severa~ benefits as stated in the
agreement. No one of the p.etitione.rs contributes any
services or property to the others, whatsoever, as clearly
designated in the agreement. They do not have any
community of interest in profits because the very nature
of the transaction precludes any profits. The only agreement, either written or o~al, or expressed or implied, in
existence by and between the petitioners is the agreement herein above set forth, insofar as trans1porting
PJ'Operty by motor vehicle is concerned.
~

f

'

' '

-

'

I
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40 American Jurisprudence 127, states:
"~ ,~Vhile it is sometimes difficult * * * to distig-uish in particular cases between joint adventures and partnerships, since the relations of ~the
parties to a joint adventure and the nature of
their association are so similar and closely akin
to a partnership, yet the two relationships are not
identical. The outstanding difference is that a
joint adventure relates to a single transaction,
although it may comprehend a business. to be continued over several years, while a partnership
relates to a general and continuing business of a
particular kind. ''

The Agreement by and between the petitioners does
not provide for any business whatever being carried on
separate and distinct from their several businesses and
that the functions "QTI.der the said agreement are incidental and ~elate only to their several principal business
endeavors. That, as a matter of fact, none of the several
businesses of the petitioners is transportation or common carrier or private carrier business. Each of the
petitioners is in the wholesale hardware business and the
transportation of their merchandise is merely incidental and essential to their several princi•pal businesses,
and the transportation facilities and transactions under
the agreement by and between the parties are several
and distinct and not a community of interest whatever.

II.

DO THE TRANSACTIONS CONDUCTED BY
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THE PETITIONERS COME WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE STATUTES OF UTAH DE·FINING
CONTRACT CARRIERS~
It is agreed by and between the parties hereto that
the petitioners herein are not common motor carriers
of vroperty. The sole question is whether or not they
are contract carriers. The definition is given in the
statute as '' * * * Contract Motor Carrier of property
means any person engaged in the transportation by
motor vehicle of property for hire and not included in
the term, common motor carrier as hereinbefore defined.
* * *" The contention of your 1petitioners herein is that
they are neither individually or jointly hauling any
property whatsoever for hire by motor vehicle. Holmes
v. Railroad Commission of California, 242 P 486, 490;
(A California case) states:
''One, who transports merely his own goods,
is of necessity engaged in some business other
than tr~ans;portation, and the transportation of
such goods is no more than an incident to such
business. So, also, one, who transports the goods
of another as a servant or agent of such other, is
not engaged in the b-q.siness of transportation,
but in so doing is engaged in the business of his
master or principal, whatever that business may
be. But one, who engages as an independent
calling in the transportation of goods for another
or for others under contract and for compensation, is engaged in the business of transportation
and is a carrier. ' '
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The above quotation in the above case was quoted
and approved in the case of Board of Railroad Commissioners, et al, against Gan1ble-Robinson Company,
et al, Sup. Ct. of Montana, 111 Pac 2nd 307, at page 309.
In the above Montana case the court stated:
•"Thus the question is \vhether in enacting
the statute the legislature meant merely to supervise and regulate those engaged in the busines~
of transporting persons and property for hire,
or also to supervise and regulate all those engaged in other businesses and using motor vehicles purely for the incidental purpose of delivering their o"\vn goods in the course of such businesses. The former would seem to be the clear intent, since the title of the Act expressed an intention to supervise, regulate and control 'Motor
Carriers Engaged in the Transportation by Motor
Vehicles of Pers·ons and Property for Hire,' etc.'
'To engage' is' to. embark in a business.' Webster's
New International Dictionary, Merriam Webster,
2d Ed. The defendants are engaged in wholesaling just as ranchers are engaged in ranching.
They are not ordinarily understood to be 'engaged
in' every occupation or activity purely incidental
to their business. One engaged in either of those
businesses and using motor vehicles for purposes
incidental thereto cannot properly be said to be
engaged in the transportation of goods, and the
title of th·e Act cannot logically be said to have
given notice to the public or legislature of ·an
intent to regulate their -use of the highways.''
A full reading of the opinion in this case is very enlightning on the subject here in issue.
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. In Christy Transfer and Storage Company v. Hatch
(Thompson et al, Interveners) Supreme court of Montana 28 P 2d 470, an action was brought by a common
carrrier to enjoin Defendant Hatch from using the highways of the state as a motor carrier. In this case the
interveners entered into an agreement with Defendant.
Hatch, whereby the interveners agreed to purchase a
described motor truck from the defendant. The truck
"\Vas to be used exclusively for hauling and transporting
merchandise sold or purchased by interveners and for
delivery to each other or to the customers of each other.
The ex1penses of upkeep, including wages for necessary
help, management and use of the truck and the purchase
price thereof were paid monthly on the basis and ratio of
the rate of merchandise carried f.or each per mile. By
its terms Hatch was employed as Transportation Manager at not less than $6.00 per day together with a bonus
for good service whenever a majority of the interveners
so determined. The question presented in this case was
virtually identical with the question at bar. The facts
of the case at bar are more strongly for the !petitioners
than in the case cited. The court stated on page 471:
''The act as disclosed by its title affects only
motor carriers engaged in the transportation of
persons and property for hire. It defines a 'Motor
Carrier' as a 'person or corporation, their lesse·es,
trustees, or receivers appointed by any court
whatsoever, ·operating motor vehicles upon any
public highway in the State of Montana for the
transportation of persons and/or property for
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hire, on a com1nercial basis either as a common
earrier or under priYate contract, agreement,
charter, ·or undertaking.' "
At page 472 the court states "for hire" is defined
in the act as follows:
''The 'vords 'for hire' mean for remuneration
of any kind, paid or promised, either directly or
indirect!y. ' '
The court held in this case that the Defendant and Interveners are not motor carriers engaged in the business
"for hire" within the meaning of the Montana Act. The
court further stated :
''Interveners are simply using 'their own
truck to transport their own merchandise ; They
do not operate for hire. Defendant is merely the
employee of interveners and is likewise not
operating for hire, within the meaning of the act."
For hire means a payment to another for services rendered. One of the questions in the case at bar is: Who
paid whom and for what? The only 1payments made by
any of the several petitioners are payments directly as
salary to its employee, the truck driver, payments of
its several pro rata share of the truck rental, for the gas,
oil and maintenance used in the truck hauling its several
goods. At no place in the operation is there any payment
by any of these petitioners to any other petitioner or
to the petitioners as a. group for the transportation of
its several goods.
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'To further illustrate, counsel quotes from the case
of Board of Railroad Commissioner v. Gamble-Robinson,
et al, suvra, which at page 311 states:
''It necessarily follows from what has been
said that the defendants are not within the statute
and cannot be denied the use of Montana streets
and highways as an incident to the conduct of
their lawful business, nor be required to apply to
plaintiffs for a certificate of public convenience
or necessity as a prerequisite to such use.''
III.
DOES THE INTERPRETATIO·N OF THE COMMISSION CONTRAVENE THE CONSTITUTIONS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH AND THE UNITED
STATES~

The commission, it is believed by petitioners, will
agree that if any of ~the several petitioners had individually rented a truck and hired a truck driver and hauled
its goods that he would not be subject to the motor
vehicle transportation act and if he was so subject, the
act would be unconstitutional. Therefore, in the above
arguments to the first question, it is contended and
argued, and the petitioners have shown that the acts
under the agreement by and between the petitioners in
this matter were several and individual. If the contentions, in the first two questions, of the petitioners
are well taken then for the commission to proceed with
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its intended actions "~ould be a violation of the individual petitioner's constitutional rights as guaranteed by
the Constitution of the State of Utah and the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. If the
act may be interpreted as the commission desires to
interpret it said act "\Vould be unconstitutional under the
Constitution of the State of Utah in that it would be
unreasonable classification. There is no more reason
at law for holding that a company may not haul its own
goods at its own expense upon the highways of the State
of Utah for its own benefit than tha't a doctor could not
haul his medical kit, or a farmer could not haul his
produce to market, or a grocer could not deliver his
groceries, or a plumber could not haul his supplies from
his shop to the place "\vhere he is to do the work, or a
carpenter could not haul his tools and lumber, or a
lawyer his brief case, supplies and books from his office
to the court house, or a Justice of the Supreme Court
take his books home from the library for study and
bring them back. Each is transporting goods for his
benefit. This was brought out in the well reasoned dissenting opinion in Holmes v. Railroad Commission,
supra. On page 493, the court stated:
''In determining the persons by whom the
highways may be used, the state has no povver, in
my judgment, under the guise of prohibiting competition, to deny to its citizens the right to use
the public highways for their own private pur;poses, vvhether for business or pleasure.''
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On page 492, it was stated :
''By the same reasoning the Legislature
could vest the commission with power to prohibit
the use of private passenger automobiles operating on the public highway because such use would
be in ·competition with regulated common carriers
of passengers with possible destruction of the
business of the latter. Such a result may not
he contemplated as within the power of the
state * * * ".
In the case of Michigan Public Utilities Commission
v. Duke, 26'6 U.S. 570, 69 L. Ed. 445 Duke had 1employed
45 men and 47 motor trucks as a motor carrier under
3 private contracts for the transportation of automobile
bodies from Detroit to T·oledo. The United States Supreme Court on page 450 states :
''Moreover, it is beyond the power of the
state by legislative fiat to convert property used
exclusively in the business of a ~)rivate carrier
into ·a public utility, or to make the owner a public
carrier, for that would be taking private property
for public use without just compensation, which
no state can do consistently with the due process
of law clause of the 14th Amendment."
CONCLUSIONS
Your petitioners maintain that they do not consti-
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tute a partnership, that they do n·ot haul any goods for
hire and hence are not subject to the jurisdiction of the
Public Service Commission of lTtah.
Your petitioners pray that the temporary writ of
prohibition be made permanent.
Respectfully submitted,
MUSSER AND GIB·SON
Attorneys for P·etitioners
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